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                        UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                           DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
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        In Re: Bair Hugger Forced Air ) File No. 15-MD-2666
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        Warming Devices Products
                                                      (JNE/)
        Liability Litigation
 5
                                             Minneapolis, Minnesota
 6
                                             March 19, 2018
                                             10:00 a.m.
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                   BEFORE THE HONORABLE FRANKLIN L. NOEL
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               UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MAGISTRATE JUDGE
                              (MOTION HEARING)
11
       APPEARANCES
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           Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography;
       transcript produced by computer.
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## 1 PROCEEDINGS IN OPEN COURT 2 3 THE COURT: Okay. This is In Re. Bair Hugger 4 Forced Air Warming Devices Products Liability Litigation. 5 We're here for a hearing on the plaintiffs' motion for an in 6 camera review and some motions to substitute parties. 7 Excuse me. Let's get everybody's appearance on the record. 8 Where are we, who is who, for the plaintiff? 9 MS. KRAFT: Your Honor, Kristine Kraft 10 representing the plaintiffs. 11 MS. LEWIS: Good morning, Your Honor. Debra Lewis representing defendant 3M and Arizant. 12 13 MS. HARRIS: Good morning, Your Honor. Charmaine 14 Harris representing defendant. 15 MR. GOSS: Good morning, Your Honor. Peter Goss 16 for defense. 17 THE COURT: Okay. You're up. 18 MS. KRAFT: Thank you, Your Honor. Again, good 19 morning. My name is Kristine Kraft. The -- I'm going to 20 address the motion for in-camera inspection. This motion concerns ten documents that involve communications between 21 22 3M's attorneys and 3M's employee, Andrew Chen. Mr. Chen has 23 been employed by 3M since 1993 as a mechanical engineer 24 specializing in thermoscience. His involvement in this case 25 relates solely to conducting internal testing on the very

Bair Hugger system that's at issue in this litigation. His involvement concerned conducting testing on the safety of the Bair Hugger system, as well as evaluating the increased risk of infection associated with the Bair Hugger system.

These ten documents that are referenced in our motion all concern that topic because that was his only involvement in this litigation, and they consist of the underlying facts and data, apparently so based on the description, but the underlying facts and data that were, in fact, used by

Mr. Chen and two of his colleagues to generate a report addressing their experimental assessment of the Bair Hugger model 750.

Because the documents on the privilege log that are at issue, these ten documents, involve underlying facts and scientific information, they are discoverable. And there is not a basis for the defendants to selectively produce the report that Mr. Chen and his colleagues prepared in October 2015, which, in fact, was disclosed and provided to their testifying expert, Dr. John Abraham, on the analysis, but yet not produce these other documents that apparently relate to the internal testing of work and evaluation of the increased risk of infection that Mr. Chen was asked to do.

These documents are discoverable for a multitude of reasons. Again, they involve factual information,

scientific-related work which, in fact, is the subject of one of your prior orders entered in this case which you addressed this issue that pertains to whether or not internal testing documents involving either material or data related to the Bair Hugger were, in fact, discoverable.

And, in fact, you addressed both the application of the work product privileges and the attorney-client privilege, and I'll go through that in a moment, but neither privilege was determined to have applied.

Here, simply because 3M's lawyer asked Mr. Chen to become involved in this regard doesn't shield the documents from disclosure. Neither the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrines apply to preclude production of underlying factual internal testing or related materials, particularly when those documents are related to a report that he prepared and, in fact, has been used by defendant's testifying expert and, in fact, relied upon in issuing his opinions in this case that will be rendered at trial.

Additionally, these materials are discoverable because none of the cases cited by 3M substantiate protecting these types of documents.

Even if Mr. Chen were categorized as an internal consulting expert in this case, that does not end the inquiry. Instead, the inquiry goes on to evaluate whether or not exceptional circumstances exist for the production of

these internal testing documents and related materials, and here, that same standard, an exception to the work product doctrine which has previously been determined to have been met by plaintiffs and therefore requiring production of other internal testing materials.

THE COURT: So compare that to -- refresh my recollection as to what the circumstances were. As I understand it, it related to something that either Mr. Benham or Mr. -- Dr. Augustine had done.

MS. KRAFT: The prior documents that you ordered to be disclosed were documents dated in the early 2000s that Dr. Augustine -- that Mr. Augustine and/or his counsel requested be done, and you determined that those documents fell within the ordinary work product doctrine but that the plaintiffs had met their burden of demonstrating substantial need for the documents as well as undue hardship associated with generating a substantial equivalence of those documents.

And for your -- and these documents are, in fact, similar and even more compelling for production here because, again, what we know is Mr. Chen's involvement was limited. It was limited to doing internal testing on the Bair Hugger products. And the -- we're only talking about ten documents. These documents, as described on the log, all relate to the forced air warming system, the safety of

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the Bair Hugger system, and nine of the ten documents at
issue were either authored by or sent by Mr. Chen or one of
his colleagues who are authors of the very report dated
October 15, 2015, that was supplied by 3M's counsel to
Dr. Abraham and, in fact, used in his review and --
          THE COURT: Hold on. Let me stop you there
because I'm confused by the convoluted nature of that
sentence. Are you saying that Dr. Abraham relied on
Dr. Chen's report?
         MS. KRAFT: He relied and used the information in
the report in connection with rendering his opinions.
          THE COURT: Is that different than relying on the
report?
         MS. KRAFT: It -- using the information and
relying on the report are two different things, and --
          THE COURT: By information, are you referring to
just objective data that Dr. Chen generated or things he
wrote down in a narrative report?
         MS. KRAFT: Okay. I'll direct the Court's
attention to some of the deposition testimony of Dr. Abraham
in this regard and let you know what I'm referring to. So
first of all, just by way of further background, at pages
143 and 144 of Dr. Abraham's deposition, he testified that
Andy Chen was one of three engineers who was with him at the
time he did the modeling of the operating room, so he was
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there from the outset.

Then at pages 43 and 44 of his deposition, we learned that Dr. Abraham had been provided with a copy of this very extensive report prepared by Mr. Chen and his two colleagues regarding the Bair Hugger system.

Then on pages 303 and 304 of his deposition,

Dr. Abraham testified that he used the report in the

following ways. At page 303, quote, he says, this is the

document which confirmed my understanding of the boundary

conditions of the Bair Hugger, so I would say it confirmed

my boundary conditions.

He then goes on to testify that many of diagrams and photographs contained in Chen's report represented the same CFD model used by Dr. Abraham. He goes on at those pages in the range of 303 and 304 to talk about the geometry from Chen's report that's referenced on page 28 of his report and states that is the same one or similar to the one that 3M provided to Dr. Abraham to do his analysis.

And then, finally, he discusses diagrams and photographs of the OR contained in Chen's October 2015 report that, in fact, represent the same CFD model used by Dr. Abraham.

So what seems to be the case here is we have ten documents on the privilege logs identified by 3M. These documents are, with the exception of one dated in 2016, but

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none of the ten documents are all dated right at the time of the preparation of this report. And we know there's a short window. Mr. Chen was asked to get involved in August of 2015. His report was prepared by October of 2015. Four of the documents were prepared -- excuse me, five of the documents were prepared the day before he issued the report, one after the date of the report. Again, most of these documents are authored by Mr. Chen or his colleagues. The defendants here have --THE COURT: And this is right around the time of Walton and Johnson, correct, that we're --MS. KRAFT: Yes. THE COURT: And do you dispute that these are ordinary work product and are simply arguing that you've met your burden to get them or do you dispute that they're even work product at all? MS. KRAFT: Well, I certainly dispute that they are ordinary work product and that we meet our exception. don't think that they're work product at all. And the reason is because these logically appear to be the underlying facts or information pertaining to the October

production of these documents.

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And certainly defendants have made arguments based on every front, one of which is opinion work product. claim that these documents are opinion work product. However, in looking at the description of the documents on the log, we see that none of the documents are even authored by an attorney or sent by an attorney. None of the descriptions used on the log use terms such as strategy, impressions, legal conclusions, legal -- or internal thoughts of counsel. Instead, the log reveals that all the documents are sent by 3M employees and that relate to, again, internal testing which is very, very critical to the plaintiffs here to be able to have the effective right to cross-examine Dr. Abraham and others about internal testing done by 3M on the products at issue, regardless of the timeframe of whether this occurred during the pendency of the Walton Johnson litigation or not, because that information is exclusively within the control of the defendants.

And in your order issued on August 9th of 2017, document --

THE COURT: Do you have the docket number of that order, by the way?

MS. KRAFT: Yes, I do. It's document No. 645.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. KRAFT: And in reference to -- referring to that order on page 4, you addressed sort of the timing of litigation versus the timing of the document, the testing documents at issue, and you indicated on page 4, quote, assuming, without deciding, that some litigation was pending at the time of the challenged documents requesting testing or performing testing were created, any testing performed on the Bair Hugger is material and relevant to the issue in this case and plaintiffs have the substantial need for these materials. Additionally, because these materials are exclusively in the possession of the defendants, the plaintiffs have no other way of obtaining this material other than through discovery.

And that same situation applies here. As discovery currently stands, we have a summary report prepared by Mr. Chen and, again, his two colleagues, whose names are referenced throughout the privilege log, but we have a summary document prepared by Mr. Chen but yet we are not in receipt of access of the underlying -- of what appears to be the underlying documents or other information related to his purpose in this litigation which is to do internal testing.

And for all of these reasons, Your Honor, we would request the Court to be the one to conduct the in-camera review to assess the validity of these claims. Again,

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there's no basis to determine if the, based on the
description that these documents involved, opinion work
product, I -- they -- it's our position they do not involve
ordinary work product for two reasons: One, not work
product at all because Mr. Chen is a fact witness who has
conducted internal testing on which their expert has relied.
That's a real distinguishing factor here. Or at least
considered or used. Whatever terminology, I do not believe
that it's dispositive, whether he used it or belies on it or
whatnot, but he was provided that information, and he
testifies very clearly about that in his deposition.
          And then, third, the application of the
attorney-client privilege here in our position is not
applicable, as you so found in your order at pages 6 and 7,
because the context of the information is factual in nature.
It does not involve providing or seeking legal advice.
description is providing information in connection with the
work that Mr. Chen has done on testing the Bair Hugger
products.
          THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
          MS. KRAFT: Thank you, Your Honor.
          THE COURT: Who's up over here, Ms. Lewis?
          MS. LEWIS: Good morning again, Your Honor,
Deborah Lewis. It's defendant's position that no
camera -- in camera review is necessary, Your Honor, for
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several reasons. Number one, as is evident from our responsive motion and the log itself, the documents that plaintiffs challenge are protected by the attorney-client privilege. How do we know that? The log identifies clearly the attorneys' names on the log on all the entries. It shows the name of outside counsel, it shows the name of in-house attorney, it shows the name of those who were involved in the assignment by in-house attorneys. It is clear what the attorney-client privilege protects. It protects attorney-client privileged communications for the client.

As Your Honor pointed out, the timing of these communications is October 2015. According to the Walton and Johnson cases, they were set for trial in March of 2016. So these communications occurred five months before an actual trial setting. These communications reflect the attorney's opinions and defense strategy for those particular cases. Communications between an attorney and client are absolutely immune from disclosure. That should end the inquiry on that alone. These are attorney-client privileged communications.

For the second reason, these documents on the log are opinion product, meaning they are reflective of the attorney's opinion, strategy, again, prior to trial. They were asked, this team was asked at the direction of legal counsel to form and perform some work that was relevant to

1 the defense of the case, and that's -- and so the work that was done was done under the direction and control of legal 2 3 counsel. 4 Plaintiffs do not argue that there are some 5 extraordinary circumstances. And as we know, case law is 6 pretty clear that opinion work product is more absolutely 7 immune from discovery. There has to be some sort of 8 extraordinary circumstance in order for that privilege to be 9 passed aside. 10 Plaintiffs don't have any evidence if this were to 11 be assumed to be opinion -- if this were assumed to be 12 ordinary work product, which it is not, but let's assume for 13 purposes of ordinary work product, if this were ordinary 14 work product, plaintiffs don't have evidence that they can't 15 do -- can't get substantially the same amount of information 16 from their own testing. 17 As we have pointed out --18 THE COURT: Except that's the point, we don't know 19 what Chen did, right, or do we? 20 MS. LEWIS: Plaintiffs have that information. 21 THE COURT: Do they know what tests he performed? 22 MS. LEWIS: They have the data, and that's the 23 point that you were making, do they have the data, which 24 they have. They had more than 14 hours of deposition time

with Dr. Abraham to question him about the data.

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       Dr. Abraham did not rely on the Chen Eaton memo.
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       he -- the -- the data in the memo confirmed his
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       understanding of the Bair Hugger flow rate and temperature,
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       but that doesn't mean because that confirmed -- that memo
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       confirmed what he understood that he relied on it. He did
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       not rely on it. He tested --
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                 THE COURT: Did he use it? What words, I guess,
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       words do we use to get the ship confused? What word, if he
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       relied on it, do you concede that it would then be
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       discoverable?
                 MS. LEWIS: I don't know that I would concede if
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       he relied on it, it would be discoverable. It -- my
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       understanding from Dr. Abraham's testimony is he came up
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       with figures on his own. When he saw the Chen report, he
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       said the Chen report data confirmed what he already knew and
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       understood.
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                 THE COURT: And does that constitute using the
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       data in some way?
                 MS. LEWIS: I think he used his own data. What
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       was in the Chen data confirmed what he already knew.
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                 THE COURT: And but the data you're telling me the
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       plaintiffs have already anyway?
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                 MS. LEWIS: The data that they have --
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                 THE COURT: I'm sorry, the data that Chen
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       generated, not Abraham's data. Do they have Chen's data?
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1 MS. LEWIS: They have Chen's data. 2 THE COURT: Okay. 3 MS. LEWIS: And so they already have the data. 4 And so there's no substantial need for these documents on 5 this log because they already have the data. I think -- I 6 mean, their argument is simply we don't have your testing, 7 and they're claiming that constitutes substantial need. And 8 we have cited numerous cases have said just the opposite, 9 that have given examples of when someone asked for someone 10 else's testing, the courts have ruled that just because they 11 have testing doesn't mean you're entitled to it, especially 12 when you can do your own testing. 13 And the case from Northern District of Illinois is 14 pretty instructive, which we cite, in which that Court ruled 15 that it -- the Court can easily conclude that 16 attorney-initiated tests were reflective of the attorneys 17 opinions and strategy and thus protected as opinion work 18 product. Even if the tests were non opinion work product, 19 they were still protected because nothing prevented the 20 plaintiff from running tests of its own. And although 21 plaintiffs might not have the same tests as defendants, it 22 would have tests nonetheless, reflecting the 23 same -- relating to the same ultimate issue. 24 Plaintiffs' issue in this case is they -- their 25 contention that the Bair Hugger is defective. Well, go get

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       your own testing to --
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                 THE COURT: Which I'm sure they've done.
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       remember sitting through three days of testimony.
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                 MS. LEWIS: That's absolutely right.
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                 THE COURT: Or argument.
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                 MS. LEWIS: They've done their own testing, so
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       they have, you know, the substantial equivalent of data that
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       they're trying to get. So just saying we don't have it is
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       not a showing a substantial need or that you can't get the
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       substantial equivalent.
                 We've cited our cases as well. But the courts are
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       coming to the conclusion that if you're wanting someone
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       else's tests and if you already have that data, in some
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       circumstances you don't need to go after someone else's
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       privileged communications. And so these documents are
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       different from your prior order.
                 THE COURT: In what way?
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                 MS. LEWIS: These tests are, number one, these are
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       tests done in during the pending litigation in Walton and
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       Johnson.
                 These tests are --
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                 THE COURT: But I assumed in the other case, in
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       the other order, assumed without deciding, that the stuff I
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       was referring to was generated in connection with
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       litigation.
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                 MS. LEWIS: That's what we were trying to
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       establish in the prior priv log challenges. The evidence
       was not as clear-cut then as it is now. But in this case it
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       is clear that these were done, again, during pending
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       litigation, done at the direction of legal counsel, done in
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       order to facilitate the defense of the case.
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       involved -- these involve opinion work product which means
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       it's more than just facts.
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                 THE COURT: But I guess so how does -- how is it
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       opinion work product? So opinion work product, as I
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       understand it, relates solely to the lawyer's opinion,
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       right?
                 MS. LEWIS: That's correct.
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                 THE COURT: What's relevant, what evidence should
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       we look at, what evidence should we generate, what evidence
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       should we discover, how do we analyze these claims.
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                 MS. LEWIS: That's correct.
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                 THE COURT: It's the lawyer's opinion, not some
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       scientist's opinion, correct?
                 MS. LEWIS: That's correct. And plaintiffs are
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       assuming that these particular documents at issue are not
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       met and that's not the case.
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                 THE COURT: But I guess that's my question, as I
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       understand it, yeah, every one of these documents is an
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       e-mail string, correct?
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                 MS. LEWIS: That's correct.
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1 And you're telling me that if I were THE COURT: 2 to look at them in camera, what I would see is a lawyer 3 saying something that is exposing her thought processes? 4 MS. LEWIS: Yes. 5 THE COURT: Not Dr. Chen's thought processes or 6 analyses or interpretations of data? 7 MS. LEWIS: Correct on interpretation of data. 8 And these e-mail strings, the way they are placed on the 9 log, by necessity, because it is an e-mail string, the 10 defendants only listed the names of those at the top of that chain, but within that e-mail chain are communications 11 12 generated by outside counsel. So contrary to Ms. Kraft's 13 thoughts, all e-mails were not generated by a nonlawyer. 14 THE COURT: Okay. 15 MS. LEWIS: That was her argument was these could 16 not be either work product or communications because they 17 were all generated by, again, a nonlawyer, but, again, 18 that's because that may be top e-mail string, e-mail string, 19 that was the last communication, but, again, within that 20 string were communications generated by one of the lawyers. 21 So although, again, it's our position that these 22 are opinion work product and, again, similar to the 23 attorney-client privilege, there has to be some 24 extraordinary circumstance why plaintiffs should be entitled 25 to have those in which the work product would not apply.

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       These, again, are different from the other ones that you
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       ordered produced because these more reflect thought
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       processes of the lawyers getting ready for trial. It was
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       not that clear on the previous orders and the documents that
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       were at issue. So these documents are not similar to the
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       documents in the other case.
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                 And so, finally, I quess, Your Honor, our argument
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       is, again, we don't believe an in camera review is even
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       necessary because the attorney-client privilege attaches to
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       each and every single document that is challenged today.
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       addition to the attorney-client privilege that applies,
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       opinion work product also applies.
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                 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Anything else,
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       Ms. Kraft?
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                 MS. KRAFT: Yes, Your Honor. If I may, please.
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                 THE COURT: Before you go, let me ask, do you have
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       the Chen data?
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                 MS. KRAFT: Well, that's exactly one of the points
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       that I was going to address. We do not have the underlying
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       data. We have the report. We have Mr. Chen's October 15,
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       2015, report. We do not have the underlying data. And, in
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       fact, I can provide certain examples of information
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       contained in this report, although --
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                 THE COURT: But the data is not going to be
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       found -- now I'm even more confused. The ten documents at
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       issue are e-mail strings, correct?
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                 MS. KRAFT: Yes, that's how they are described out
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       there. The attachments or additional information, I don't
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       know, or they could be just discussions about the report and
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       the testing that he did. And in either case, it's our
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       position it would be discoverable.
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                 THE COURT: But -- but you've got the report. So
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       let's assume for a moment the strings are something like
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       holy crap, look at this, we're going to lose this case, is
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       that relevant -- is that discoverable if that's between a
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       lawyer and Dr. Chen in response --
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                 MS. KRAFT: Yes.
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                 THE COURT: -- to the lawyer's request to do this
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       testing stuff?
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                 MS. KRAFT: Yes, that communication would not
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       involve rendering legal advice or providing legal advice, it
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       would be I guess a factual opinion by Mr. Chen in that
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       scenario.
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                 THE COURT: But the requests at issue aren't going
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       to necessarily give you the data underlying Chen's report,
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       will it?
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                 MS. KRAFT: I don't know. And that's
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       particularly -- and, frankly, we think that information is
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       discoverable. We don't know where that -- where those
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       documents may be. We did not find descriptions on the log
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       that would seem to, per se, state this is the underlying
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       data.
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                 THE COURT: Well, where did the report say the
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       data is?
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                 MS. KRAFT: It doesn't indicate. It makes -- this
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       is a confidential document so I hesitate to make reference
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       to certain aspects of it, but there are references in the
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       report to certain types of testing being done. And we do
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       not have the data. Certain CFD, computational fluid
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       dynamic, analysis and experimental flow digitalization were
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       used. We don't have that underlying data. There is
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       information in the report describing a geometry for the CFD
13
       model, a 3D geometric model was created and generated by
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       visiting site and certain dimensions were taken of the room
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       and the equipment. We don't have that background
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       information.
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                 There's other underlying --
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                 THE COURT: Okay. I got it.
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                 MS. KRAFT: So I think counsel may be defining the
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       term data differently than we do. We have the report, but
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       the underlying data we do not have.
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                 A couple of other issues that I didn't point out
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       before that I think are important here after hearing
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       counsel's argument is that the portion -- in the event there
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       are opinions and legal conclusions or strategies of legal
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counsel in these documents, which is not apparent at all from the descriptions, but let's assume that's the case, only that portion of the document would be protected, not the remainder of the e-mail string. And certainly based on the descriptions that have been provided, it seems very reasonable that the communications are from Mr. Chen or his colleagues and relate to providing information about the safety of the Bair Hugger system. So we would -- this is -- this only heightens the basis for our request to conduct an in-camera review of these documents to make the Court's own determination as to the applicability of the privilege here.

With respect to our substantial need for this information, whether it's e-mail communication commenting about the tests that were done or the underlying data, which we think is likewise discoverable, but we have a -- what we're talking about here are -- is the testing and comments of the testing or information related to the testing that is exclusively in the defendant's control. We're not talking about -- I mean, an inventory of Bair Hugger systems that we could conduct our own tests. You know, we've done that. That's not at issue here. It's the, similar to what you found before, it's the internal work of the -- of the defendants that is exclusively within their control is relevant here. We cannot be in a position to replicate it

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       or duplicate it in any way if we don't know -- if we don't
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       have it, and we certainly are not -- or we would be placed
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       in an unfair position of not being able to effectively use
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       the information or cross-examine defendants' witnesses about
 5
       the information, you know, if applicable.
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                 I would also state that the attorney-client
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       privilege is applied narrowly in order to ensure that the
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       truth and information, you know, pertaining to a subject
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       matter is disclosed and that the case citation I believe was
10
       referenced in your order.
                 And those are all the issues that I wanted to
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12
       address, unless Your Honor has some questions.
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                 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
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                 I have a question for Ms. Lewis first.
                                                         When you
15
       say the plaintiffs have the Chen data, are you referring to
16
       the narrative report that Ms. Kraft refers to? Or is there
17
       somewhere where there's actual objective data generated by
18
       Dr. Chen's testing?
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                 MS. LEWIS: That's why Mr. Goss was standing up.
20
       He can probably better explain the data. But it's my
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       understanding that plaintiffs do have and, in fact,
22
       questioned Dr. Abraham for, again, 14 hours, on the data.
23
                 THE COURT: That Chen generated?
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                 MS. LEWIS: Yeah, it's called the geometry.
25
       think that means the calculations --
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                 THE COURT:
                             Okay.
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                 MS. LEWIS: -- of a particular --
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                 THE COURT: Well, if your answer to my question is
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       Mr. Goss knows, I'll let Mr. Goss speak.
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                 MS. LEWIS: I believe I'm right, but I think he
 6
       can define that better.
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                 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
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                 MR. GOSS: All right. Ms. Lewis brought me along
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       because I have suffered through more of this than she has
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       and I am probably more familiar with the documents than
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       either counsel here. They do have the data. If Your Honor
12
       recalls from Mr. Assad's presentation, various
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       presentations, regarding computational fluid dynamics, you
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       basically need three inputs: you need the temperature, you
15
       need the flow rate, and then you need -- you do need some
16
       specifics about the room, including the geometry of the
17
       room, okay, and that is simply what we call a CAD file or
18
       computer-aided design.
19
                 And the CAD file that Dr. Abraham used in his CFD
20
       is the same one that Mr. Chen developed based on an
21
       operating room at Fairview Southdale Hospital. And that
22
       just tells you the configuration of the room and the patient
23
       and the draping. That CAD file was produced more than a
24
       year ago. So plaintiffs have that same CAD file. The only
25
       remaining questions are do they have the temperature of the
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1
       air coming out of the Bair Hugger and the flow rate of the
2
       air coming out of the Bair Hugger. Both of those are
 3
       disclosed in Mr. Chen's memo. There's nothing else that you
 4
       need to do a CFD, according to Dr. Elghobashi's own
 5
       testimony. So and, in fact, they relied on similar
 6
       documents to make their CFD to what's described in the Chen
 7
       report. So that's what we mean we say they have the
 8
       underlying data.
 9
                 What they seem to be asking for is actual CFD
10
       files, after you plug the information into the computer,
11
       what does the computer produce, okay, that's a different
12
       thing. Now, they've spent a lot of time and money with
13
       Dr. Elghobashi using those same inputs to develop their own
14
       CFDs.
15
                 THE COURT: All right. I get that. But I guess
16
       my question is, so does Dr. Chen run those things? Does he
17
       run the CAD file, the temperature, and the flow rate through
18
       the computer and get something back from the computer saying
19
       here's what happens at this temperature with this flow rate
20
       in this room?
21
                 MR. GOSS: Yeah, so it would be the same as
22
       Dr. Elghobashi's CFD and Dr. Abraham's CFD.
23
                 THE COURT: Well, if they were all the same, we
24
       wouldn't be here, I'm guessing.
25
                 MR. GOSS: No, that's right. But you put it into
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1
       the computer and you get a output. Now, Dr. Abraham is not
2
       relying on -- he's never seen the internal 3M CFD. He's
 3
       seen the memo that Chen prepared that gave certain input.
                 THE COURT: But do the plaintiffs have Dr. -- is
 4
 5
       it Dr. Chen or Mr. Chen? I've heard both. Is he a doctor?
                 MR. GOSS: You know, I think he is a Ph.D. so.
 6
 7
                 THE COURT: Okay.
 8
                 MR. GOSS: He's a very humble guy, though, so.
 9
                 THE COURT: Does -- do the plaintiffs have
10
       whatever he generated with his CAD file, his flow rate, his
11
       temperature?
12
                 MR. GOSS: No, they only have the inputs, and the
13
       reason for that is this was done under direction of counsel
14
       to assess whether the CFD project would be worth pursuing at
15
       all with an outside lawyer -- with an outside expert, okay,
16
       and that's why Dr. Abraham has never seen any of these
17
       results. And at trial in May he is not going to testify
18
       about them, he's not going to rely on them, he's only going
19
       to rely on his own work.
20
                 THE COURT: So what does he mean when he
21
       testifies, as I understand it, that Dr. Chen's data is
22
       consistent with his own data?
23
                 MR. GOSS: Right. So counsel is trying to get him
24
       to admit that he relied on the memo, and he said, no, I have
25
       my own experience with these blankets from doing my own
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1 research before I was retained for this litigation. 2 saw the Chen memo, it was consistent with the inputs that I 3 used for air temperature and flow rate out of the Bair 4 Hugger. I didn't rely on it. It confirmed that the inputs 5 I used were correct. 6 And so by plaintiffs' argument, they're saying we 7 need the CFD files. They haven't produced Elghobashi's CFD files. All we have is videos from it. They've said the CFD 8 9 files are locked up in a super computer down in Austin, 10 Texas. So it's hardly fair for them to say we need 3M's 11 internal CFD file which are not going to be shown in trial 12 which our expert has never seen when their expert has not 13 even produced the software he used to generate his CFD. 14 THE COURT: All right. All right. I'll take the 15 matter under advisement. 16 There's also then an issue regarding substitute of 17 parties, correct? Who's got that issue? 18 MS. HARRIS: Good morning, Your Honor. Charmaine Harris for defendant. 19 20 THE COURT: Ms. Harris. 21 MS. HARRIS: As a preliminary matter, I should 22 mention that defendants noticed both hearings and so I'm not 23 sure even if plaintiffs are going to call in or what they're 24 going to do. I don't know. 25 Are you representing plaintiffs in this matter?

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1
                 MS. KRAFT: Your Honor, for on behalf of the
2
       plaintiffs, I would ask the Court to consider the briefing
 3
       solely in connection with this issue and would rely on
 4
       the --
 5
                 THE COURT: We haven't heard from anybody?
 6
                 THE CLERK: We have not.
 7
                 THE COURT: These all -- there's three of them.
 8
       Is that right?
 9
                 MS. HARRIS: Two.
10
                 THE COURT: Two. I'm sorry, what are the two?
11
       I've got three things in front of me to so I'm confused.
12
       This is Summers Price -- I'm sorry.
13
                 MS. HARRIS: Yeah, she -- Ms. Price is connected
14
       with the Andrews case.
15
                 MS. KRAFT: Oh, okay.
16
                 MS. HARRIS: And then we have.
17
                 THE COURT: Sandra Vann.
18
                 MS. HARRIS: Sandra Vann, correct.
19
                 THE COURT: Okay.
20
                 MS. KRAFT: Yes, Your Honor, I would say I do not
21
       represent any of those plaintiffs so I guess I would retract
22
       my statement and say I -- I'm not here appearing in those
23
       cases and so I do not know, frankly, if they have submitted
24
       a brief in this regard.
25
                 THE COURT: Okay. Let me --
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1
                 MS. KRAFT: So I'm sorry.
2
                 THE COURT: -- start all over again. So I've got
 3
       before me two matters, civil No. 17-3276 which relates to
 4
       Summer Price individually and on behalf of the estate of
 5
       Larry Andrews, and in that matter plaintiff
 6
       seeks -- plaintiff Summer Price seeks to be substituted for
 7
       the deceased, Larry Andrews, and defendant objects, correct,
 8
       correct, Ms. Harris?
 9
                 MS. HARRIS: Correct, Your Honor.
10
                 THE COURT: And then it appears to me based on the
11
       documents I have that Ms. -- or Summers Price and Larry
12
       Andrews estate are represented by Seth Webb of Seth Sharrock
13
       Webb -- I'm sorry, Seth Sharrock Webb of Brown & Crouppen in
14
       St. Louis, Missouri.
15
                 MS. HARRIS: Correct.
16
                 THE COURT: And the next matter then is the case
17
       involving Sandra Vann which is civil No. 16-841. And,
18
       again, that's a situation of substitution the defendants
19
       oppose, correct?
20
                 MS. HARRIS: Correct, Your Honor.
21
                 THE COURT: And it appears, to me, that Ms. Vann
22
       and her estate are represented by Kirk Goza, G-O-Z-A, of
23
       Goza and Honnold in Leawood, Kansas.
24
                 MS. HARRIS: Correct, Your Honor.
25
                 THE COURT: Okay. So let me just confer with my
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1
       clerk for one moment.
           (The Court conferred with his clerk.)
2
 3
                 THE COURT: Counsel, it's my understanding, then,
 4
       though, Ms. Harris, that the notice of this motion and this
 5
       hearing were served on those through ECF.
 6
                 MS. HARRIS: Correct.
 7
                 THE COURT: Were served on the individual
 8
       plaintiff's lawyers.
 9
                 MS. HARRIS: Correct, Your Honor.
10
                 THE COURT: Okay. And you have no other
       information?
11
12
                 MS. KRAFT: I do not, Your Honor.
13
                 THE COURT: All right. Then I have the papers.
14
       Ms. Harris, go.
15
                 MS. HARRIS: Do you -- do you want --
16
                 THE COURT: If there's any argument you want to
17
       make in addition to what's in the papers.
18
                 MS. HARRIS: I'll make it quick then. For the
19
       Larry Andrews case, Summer Price has asked to be the proper
20
       party to be subsisted, but under Georgia law, a substituted
21
       party requires legal appointment and she has not produced
22
       any documentation evidencing that she is the administrator
23
       or executor of the estate of Larry Andrews. Additionally,
24
       no PFS sheet has been submitted. And so therefore, we ask
25
       that the motion be denied.
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1 THE COURT: Okay.

MS. HARRIS: For Sandra Vann, again, we ask that his motion be denied as well. Under Colorado law, the personal representative stands in place of the decedent's shoes in a survival action. However, by counsel's own admission, Jesse Cooper has initiated proceedings to be the legal representative but, again, has not produced any papers actually evidencing that he is the legal representative. So while he might be the heir, he is not the legal representative. And so we ask that his motion as well be denied.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. I will take those under advisement and issue an order shortly.

Anything else for anybody on any of these issues? Plaintiff?

MS. KRAFT: If I may just one point, to
the -- our -- our argument with respect to these documents
and why we believe they do not fall within the scope of
either privilege, I just want to emphasize is not
dispositive or does not hinge on whether or not these same
documents were provided to Dr. Abraham. We need to look at
the documents based on the description of the log which is
why an in-camera review is so important here to evaluate
whether or not any of these privilege claims we discussed
earlier apply.

And then secondly, on the underlying data issue, if I may ask leave of court for five days to provide any other information responding to Mr. Goss's argument, I will acknowledge that I do not have the details associated with that type of information to be able to address the Court in that regard.

The reason we discussed underlying data was, you know, in part because if these -- these documents do involve underlying data, that, again, I think heightens the reasoning that we have for producing these documents and that they're not privileged because, again, as the status would be, we have the expert report that was provided and not underlying data. But even if this information does not involve underlying data in our terminology and as I understand it when I appeared here, the information, to the extent it's not involving attorney impressions and strategies fall outside of the privilege because of the internal testing that Mr. Chen's sole role was here. So thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Ms. Lewis, anything else? You're thinking of something to say. Don't feel compelled. But I just want to give you the opportunity.

MS. LEWIS: I only want to say this, Your Honor, and that is, as we said in our papers, there are ten documents they challenge, nine of them, their focus seems to

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1
       be on the CFD. None of the documents have anything to do
2
       with the CFD.
 3
                 THE COURT:
                             Okay.
                 MS. LEWIS: And that's what we've told plaintiffs.
 4
 5
                 THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Harris, anything else you
 6
       want to say?
 7
                 MS. HARRIS: No, Your Honor.
                 THE COURT: Mr. Goss.
 8
 9
                 MR. GOSS: No, sir.
10
                 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you all, very much.
11
       will take these advisement. I'll issue an order shortly,
12
       and we are in recess.
13
            (Proceedings concluded at 10:51 a.m.)
14
15
16
17
18
                I, Staci A. Heichert, certify that the foregoing is
19
       a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the
20
       above-entitled matter.
21
22
                     Certified by: <u>s/ Staci A. Heichert</u>
23
                                      Staci A. Heichert,
                                      RDR, CRR, CRC
24
25
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